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ABSTRACT
Recent events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against
the United States and the national disaster of Hurricane Katrina
demonstrated the acute need for interagency collaboration. Using a
semi-inductive method, we conducted two studies with senior homeland
security leaders to learn more about organizations’ collaborative capacity
during the early planning stages. In study One, we used an interorgan-
izational systems perspective to identify factors that create or deter
effective collaboration. Study Two elicited vignettes from a second group
of senior homeland security leaders to gain further insights into the ways
in which their organizations are successfully building collaborative
capacity.
While accounts of 9/11 are filled with examples of heroism and valor, re-
ports also reveal that communication, coordination, and command failures
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cost hundreds of precious lives (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States, 2004). We know, for example, that the New York
Police and Fire Departments were aware of the need for a single
radio frequency to share time critical information in the event of a disas-
ter. In 1996 and 1997, dozens of new radios had been distributed to
key police and fire commanders to address failures identified in the 1993
World Trade Center bombing. Nevertheless, coordination stalled when
representatives of the two departments could not agree on who would be
in control of the interagency frequency and who would decide when it
would be used. As a result, the radios remained in the fire chiefs’ car trunks
and on the police chiefs’ shelves on September 11th (Dwyer & Flynn, 2004).
This is but one example of a disastrous consequence that resulted from
a lack of collaboration among agencies as they prepared for terrorists’
attacks.
After 9/11, the nation turned its attention to terrorism and the need to
better collaborate among local, state, and federal agencies. In the spring of
2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established, with
22 distinct agencies and bureaus and more than 180,000 employees. The
formation of the DHS was a direct response to interagency shortcomings
associated with 9/11. It was aimed at increasing interagency integration,
preparation, and responsiveness in the increasingly uncertain, complex, and
hostile context of terrorist threats.
Weaknesses in the newly formed Department became apparent during the
interagency fiascoes of Hurricane Katrina that impacted nearly one-half
million people in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Once again the
failures of local, state, and federal agencies’ capacities to collaborate re-
vealed acute weaknesses in preparation, alarming failures in translating
preparation into action, and the inability to improvise in the face of life-
threatening events. In short, reports now make it clear that the development
of collaborative capacity in the preparedness stages would have reduced the
devastating effects of this economic and human disaster (Comfort, 2005;
United States Government Accountability Office, September 2005).
While the need for collaboration may seem obvious, Katrina and 9/11 are
simply dramatic and visible examples revealing agencies’ failure to develop
adequate collaborative capacity. For our purposes, we define collaborative
capacity as the ability of organizations to enter into, develop, and sustain
interorganizational systems in pursuit of collective outcomes. Organizations
fail at collaboration for many reasons: organizations have their own mis-
sions with goals and incentives that often conflict with one another; agencies
often have histories of distrust that are hard to alter; leaders may not
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actively support collaborative efforts; and coordination systems and struc-
tures that might support collaboration are often lacking (United States
Government Accountability Office, December 2002).
After viewing these disasters, we became intrigued by the question of why
collaboration is so difficult in the preparation phase and wanted to identify
factors that might be leveraged to overcome these barriers. To this end, we
conducted two studies with senior homeland security officials. We chose a
semi-inductive approach to identify critical factors that create and deter
effective interagency collaboration during the earliest planning stages when
organizations prepare for potential disasters. In this chapter, we begin by
briefly discussing the construct of collaborative capacity and then explain
the need for collaboration in the preparation stages. Next, we present the




Collaborative capacity as it relates to interagency collaboration resonates in
the work of a number of academics and practitioners (e.g., Bardach, 1998;
Gray, 1989; Huxham, 1996; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Seidman,
1970). Pelfrey (2005) defines collaboration for homeland security as ‘‘agen-
cies, organizations, and individuals from many tiers of public and private
sectors, working, training, and exercising together for the common purpose
of preventing terrorist threats to people and property’’ (p. 7). For the pur-
pose of this study, we also include activities related to natural disasters.1
A capacity for collaboration enhances the probability of mission completion
by leveraging dispersed resources. The benefits of developing collaborative
capabilities include cost savings through the transfer of smart practices,
better decision making as a result of advice and information obtained from
colleagues, enhanced capacity for collective action by dispersed units, and
innovation through the cross-pollination of ideas and recombination of
scarce resources (Hansen & Nohria, 2004).
In the case of Homeland Security, we argue that developing a capacity for
interagency collaboration is critical both for efficiently conducting routine
tasks and for innovatively responding and improvising in the face of ter-
rorist threats or natural disasters. While collaboration may not be equally
desirable in all cases or in all stages of interagency work, it is likely to be
more critical as decision making and task interdependencies increase. Our
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focus is on identifying this capacity during the preparation stage prior to the
demands and incentives generated in the face of an actual crisis.
THE NEED FOR COLLABORATION IN THE
PREPARATION STAGES
DHS has identified several phases that correspond to a terrorist threat or
natural disaster: detection, prevention, response, recovery, and incident
management. Coordination and collaboration are critical in all these phases,
with agencies seemingly more capable of working together in the response
phase. Experience tells us that agencies are less able to work together effec-
tively as they prepare for a terrorist attack or national disaster.
Even though homeland security efforts typically focus on the response
stage, scholars are now beginning to develop a strategic approach to pre-
paredness. Pelfrey (2005) underscores the importance of preparedness and
has developed a cycle of preparedness that places the greatest weight on
prevention because effective preventative measures are assumed to deter,
detect, prevent, or eliminate potential threats. According to Pelfrey (2005),
collaboration and information sharing are the two most essential ap-
proaches to prevention. Further, she argues that collaboration requires col-
legiality, trust, flexibility, openness, mutual respect, social capital, and
pathways of communication. While inflexibility and cultural restrictions
create substantial barriers. Once collaboration is established, information
sharing becomes more effective.
METHODS
Data reported in this chapter were gathered in two different ways and at two
different points in time. All of the study’s participants are experienced
professionals working for civilian, government, or military organizations
from around the U.S. who have on-going DHS responsibilities. Illustrative
organizations and positions include: USNORTHCOM (mid- to senior-
ranking officers), U.S. Coast Guard, Centers for Disease Control, Directors
of Offices of Emergency Management, captains and chiefs of city-level police,
and fire departments. All participants were enrolled in a master’s degree
program in Homeland Security at the Naval Postgraduate School.2 The stu-
dents are resident for two weeks each term and do distance education along
with their full-time work commitments during the remainder of the program.
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RESULTS
Study One was a workshop conducted by the authors (and one other col-
league3) in 2004 and included 25 participants mentioned above. The purpose
of the workshop was to identify factors that created conditions for suc-
cessful interagency collaboration during the preparation phase. We also
identified barriers to interagency collaboration. Study Two involved a sec-
ond group of participants who were asked to provide critical incidents about
successful interagency collaboration during the preparation phase. We re-
port a summary of the critical factors as well as examples to illustrate key
factors.
Study One: Thematic Analysis of Success Factors and Barriers
The workshop began with the following instructions to the participants:
‘‘Think back to a specific DHS or other effort that included at least two
other agencies or organizations that you consider to have been a successful
collaboration in the preparation phase (not response phase) of DHS. Iden-
tify three key factors that contributed to this success.’’ Participants were
asked to record a brief description of each success factor and a word or
short phrase to summarize the factor. They also identified the key partic-
ipating organizations. This activity was repeated to identify three key bar-
riers to collaboration as evident in a particular experience they had when
interagency planning or prevention efforts were not successful.
Following the workshop, the data were transcribed into two spreadsheets
for further analysis. Through an iterative process, the research team analy-
zed and consolidated the factors into common themes to create a more
parsimonious and usable taxonomy. Ultimately, Galbraith’s (2002) frame-
work for organization design seemed most useful for organizing and com-
municating the themes derived from the DHS professionals. The five main
elements adapted from Galbraith’s ‘‘Star’’ model are Strategy, Structure,
People, Incentives, and Lateral Mechanisms. We used this model because it
offers a systematic diagnosis of organizational factors that both enhance
and impede collaboration, while also guiding action toward improved col-
laborative capacity.
Table 1 presents the specific themes derived from the success factors and
barriers identified by the homeland security professionals. These themes are
organized by the five elements of the organization design model. Factors
reported in Table 1 include all those identified by at least three individuals
(i.e., 12 percent of participants). Those indicated in bold font were named by
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at least six individuals (25 percent). The most frequently named factors are
discussed below.
Success Factors. Overall, a vast majority of the participating professionals
identified having a shared purpose as a critical success factor. Two of the




‘‘Success’’ Factors ‘‘Barrier’’ Factors
Purpose and strategy ! ‘‘Felt need’’ to collaborate
! Common goal or recognized
interdependence
! Adaptable to interests of other
organizations
! Divergent goals
! Focus on local organization
over cross-agency (e.g.,
regional) concerns
! Lack of goal clarity
! Not adaptable to interests of
other organizations
Structure ! Formalized coordination
committee or liaison roles
! Sufficient authority of
participants
! Impeding rules or policies
! Inadequate authority of
participants
! Inadequate resources
! Lack of accountability
! Lack of formal roles or
procedures for managing
collaboration
Lateral mechanisms ! Social capital (i.e.,
interpersonal networks)
! Effective communication and
information exchange
! Technical interoperability
! Lack of familiarity with other
organizations
! Inadequate communication and
information sharing (distrust)
Incentives ! Collaboration as a prerequisite
for funding or resources
! Leadership support and
commitment
! Absence of competitive
rivalries
! Acknowledged benefits of
collaboration (e.g., shared
resources)
! Competition for resources
! Territoriality
! Organization-level distrust
! Lack of mutual respect
! Apathy





! Commitment and motivation
! Lack of competency
! Arrogance, hostility, animosity
Note: Items in bold were identified by at least 25 percent of the study participants.
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three success factors related to ‘‘purpose and strategy’’ were named by at
least 25 percent of the participants. Purpose can be driven by a commonly
perceived risk or threat (‘‘felt need’’) or a common goal such as improving
information sharing, coordinated training, or overall preparedness. Accom-
plishing a shared purpose is enabled by the third factor in this category – the
willingness to adapt the collaborative effort to the needs and interests of
other participating organizations.
‘‘Lateral mechanisms’’ were also frequently mentioned as contributing to
success. Specifically, social capital and effective communication were named
by at least 25 percent of the participants. Social capital represents the in-
terpersonal trust and exchange orientations that come from human inter-
action providing an important foundation for civic behavior (e.g., Adler &
Kwon, 2002; Putnam, 2000). We classified social capital as a lateral mech-
anism within the organization design framework. Examples of this phe-
nomenon include:
1. ‘‘[Our success was the] development of camaraderie/esprit de corps to
carry the group through conflicts.’’
2. ‘‘[We had] a longtime history working together.’’
Effective communication was a related lateral mechanism that was also
named with great frequency by study participants. While respondents often
did not elaborate this factor, some characterizations of effective commu-
nication were offered, to include: timely dissemination of information, free
flow of information, and the establishment of communications systems and
processes across organizations. Effective communication, along with the
increased familiarity that comes with interpersonal networks, provides an
important means for collaboration.
‘‘Incentives’’ was the third category of factors mentioned most frequently
by the participants. In particular, government grant requirements were cited
frequently as contributing to successful collaboration. Comments in the
discussion at the workshop as well as the results of the analysis of ‘‘barriers’’
indicated that there is often a history of competition for resources among
city, county, regional, and state-level service providers. The competition can
be across agencies or within an agency but across jurisdictions. By estab-
lishing a requirement that grant proposals be developed with multiagency
participation, an initial incentive to collaborate is established. While this
does not guarantee success, it creates an opportunity to develop other im-
portant collaborative capabilities. Collaborating in the development of a
grant proposal is a focused, time-limited activity with clearly identified
‘‘payoffs.’’ The process of this effort can generate a better understanding of
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other organizations’ interests and capabilities, create social capital as inter-
personal relationships are developed, and may result in the establishment of
temporary or permanent structures for collaboration and processes for in-
formation exchange. Incentives to collaborate can be achieved through
mandates or external requirements for funding (Cummings, 1984).
Another frequently mentioned incentive to collaborate was strong lead-
ership. A leader who clearly expresses commitment to a vision of collab-
oration with other agencies can provide an important incentive for other
organizational members to engage in this ‘‘new’’ activity. This is similar to
the acknowledged role of leadership in effective change management (e.g.,
Kotter, 1990).
Barriers to Collaboration. The identified barriers to collaboration sub-
stantially reinforce the factors identified as contributing to success, even
though they are not an exact replication of the capabilities described above.
For example, ‘‘lack of familiarity with other organizations’’ and ‘‘inade-
quate communication and information sharing’’ represent missing enablers
of collaboration. Some participants identified distrust as a cause of inad-
equate communication. Distrust was sometimes characterized at the organ-
izational level, as in ‘‘the organizations have a history of distrust.’’ Other
times the participants attributed distrust to individuals; in this case, we
categorized the factor into the design factor of People. Behaviors that are
both instigators and symptoms of distrust included ‘‘arrogance, hostility,
and animosity’’ in the People category and ‘‘lack of mutual respect’’ when
attributed to organizations (in the Incentives category).
Two other frequently cited barriers were ‘‘competition for resources’’ and
‘‘territoriality and turf protection.’’ These two factors were categorized as
(dis)incentives. These factors are related to the Lateral Mechanisms and
People factors described above. While the causal relationship is not defin-
itive, a clear relationship exists among competition/territoriality and lack of
familiarity, inadequate communication, and distrust. Together, these system
dimensions can create a continuing cycle of dysfunction. When organiza-
tions are competitive, distrustful, or just unfamiliar, with each other, this
can impede necessary communications. The inadequacy of communications,
in turn, continues the lack of familiarity, or in the more extreme cases, can
increase distrust. This suggests that specific interventions to disrupt this
cycle and shift the alignment toward constructive interactions are necessary
to build collaborative capacity.
While mentioned less frequently, other barriers to effective interorgan-
izational collaboration were classified as Structural. Specific examples in-
clude: procedural prohibitions such as security classifications, lack of formal
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roles and procedures to enable collaboration, inadequate authority of par-
ticipants to engage in negotiation or decision making on behalf of their
organization, and lack of accountability. Most of these are indicators of
problems that can exist in ‘‘under-designed’’ systems (Cummings, 1984).
Because well-established, institutional mechanisms for coordination are un-
likely to exist or are likely to be underdeveloped in extra-organizational
relationships, the importance of leadership, followership, and colleagueship
(i.e., the capacity for mutual adjustment) is increased.
Study Two: Thematic Analysis of Success Factors
We undertook the second study approximately 18 months following the first
to both validate and elaborate the findings described above. This study
involved a different group of students in the same Homeland Security mas-
ter’s program. They were from similar organizations with similar mid- to
upper-level management positions. The design for the second study was
different, because we were interested in eliciting more detail about the fac-
tors and the relationships among the success factors for interagency col-
laboration. Since most of the students’ master’s program is conducted using
distance learning while the professionals maintain their full-time jobs, dis-
cussion questions are often posted by their faculty on an electronic black-
board. We posed a discussion question to which 26 students responded;
these postings could be viewed by other class members and were ultimately
used as part of their course discussions. The data solicitation question was
worded as follows:
One of the few consistent findings in homeland security is that effective collaboration is
the foundation of successful prevention. There is a need, however, to understand how we
can get better at collaboration. Think about a specific homeland security (or related)
effort that included at least two other agencies or organizations that you consider to
have been a successful collaboration. Whenever possible, use an effort that was oriented
to preparedness or prevention, not to response.
(a) Briefly (one or two sentences) describe the event including the names of the primary
organizations that were involved in the collaboration.
(b) Rank order the three key factors that contributed to the success of the collabo-
ration (1 ¼ most critical success factor).
(c) Finally, provide a brief explanation of why the most critical success factor (your
#1 factor) mattered.
Table 2 presents the thematic analysis derived from the success factors
identified by this group of professionals. As in Table 1, at least three
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individuals named all items presented, and those in bold font were identified
by at least six individuals (i.e., 25 percent of participants). There is sub-
stantial reinforcement of the thematic factors derived from Study One, with
a couple of new additions. Of significant note is the fact that the three
factors under the organization design element of Purpose and Strategy are
the same as the three factors identified in Study One: (1) felt need to col-
laborate; (2) common goal; and (3) willingness to address other agency’s
interests or cross-agency goals versus local organizational goals. However,
in this study, each factor was named by at least 25 percent of the respond-
ents; thus, this domain was seen as providing a critical success factor for at
least a majority of the participants in this study. While similar to each other,
these three factors show a somewhat different emphasis that provides im-
portant descriptive value in terms of understanding the dimensions of
shared purpose that can be developed to improve collaboration.
Two other factors that were frequently named in Study One are again
reinforced in Study Two. First, an important Incentive is created when
interagency collaboration is a prerequisite for grant funding or other re-
sources. Second, the social capital available through personal relationships
creates a Lateral Mechanism for collaboration. Some participants cited this




Purpose and strategy ! ‘‘Felt need’’ to collaborate
! Common goal
! Willingness to address other agency’s interests or cross-agency
goals versus local organizational goals
Structure ! Formalized structure for coordination (e.g., committee or liaison
roles)
! Formalized processes (meetings, deadlines, agendas)
! Sufficient authority of participants
! Role clarity
! Dedicated assets (people, resources) for collaboration
Lateral mechanisms ! Social Capital (i.e., interpersonal networks)
! Effective communication and information exchange
! Technical interoperability
! Combined training events
Incentives ! Collaboration as a prerequisite for funding or resources
People ! Respect for other parties’ interests, expertise, roles, perspectives
! Perseverance/commitment
Note: Items in bold were identified by at least 25 percent of the study participants.
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factor as foundational to the initiation of collaborative activities. Others
described the value of developing personal relationships in early phases of
collaborative activities. As relationships develop, social capital accumulates
in the form of increased respect, trust, information exchange, and mutual
understanding, all of which contribute to increased success in collaboration
and an increase in what we call collaborative capacity. A new finding in this
study was the identification of combined training events, which we catego-
rized as a Lateral Mechanism, that contributed to successful collaboration.
The role of some formalized structure for collaboration (e.g., interagency
committee, liaison roles) was a stronger outcome in Study Two than in
Study One. While mentioned less frequently, other specific structural di-
mensions were identified including role clarity, dedicated assets (e.g., time,
people), and formalized processes (e.g., deadlines, agendas) that increase
accountability for collaboration. Assuring that people with adequate au-
thority for decision making or resource allocation are involved in the in-
teragency effort also was reinforced in Study Two.
Study Two: Narrative Examples of Success Factors
Many respondents provided much more detail than requested by the
data solicitation instructions above. Samples of responses are presented
below to provide some increased richness to the themes identified and
offer further clarification to the conceptual model. In addition, the vignettes
provide insights about the relationships among factors that can improve
collaboration. The quotes come directly from the participant responses,
but, to protect their anonymity, specific organizations and locales are not
given.
Purpose: ‘‘Felt Need to Collaborate.’’ The following quote illustrates the
fragility of relying solely on threat response as the aligning factor for in-
teragency collaboration.
The most critical success factor is the recognition of the need to engage in prevention
activities by all partners. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security designed the
‘‘Buffer Zone Protection’’ training course and the [State] Department of Public Safety
hosted the course. [Our city] sent officers to attend the course. The [county] Emergency
Management Agency engaged in vulnerability assessments, and private sector partners
were cooperative and receptive to working with [police] officers. This window of op-
portunity may slip by soon. Once people no longer believe terrorism is a real threat they
will be less willing to cooperate in this type of activity.
This quote also suggests the value of the training event as a lateral mech-
anism for bringing parties together and the consequent initiation of personal
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connections among police officers, emergency management workers, and
private sector representatives. However, the final statement can be taken to
imply that powerful institutional barriers to collaboration could easily
overtake the current shared purpose of responding to terrorist threats as the
sense of imminent threat recedes.
Collaborative Structure. As noted in the thematic analysis above, several
participants identified the establishment of a formal structure for collabo-
ration as a key factor to success. The following vignette is an example:
What had [the most] beneficial impact on collaboration was the formation of a multi-
agency teamy. It involved creating a Community Defense Unit (CDU) that not only
encompassed the Joint Terrorism Task Force, but also included officers/agents from the
11 different state, federal, county, and municipal agencies. This collective effort focused
on everyone’s joint mission of countering terrorism by conducting criminal investiga-
tions and surveillance.
This police officer clearly stipulates that the establishment of a structure that
brought together representatives of different agencies and jurisdictions en-
abled a secondary factor that was the determination of a ‘‘joint mission.’’
The statement also implies that the nature of this joint mission (criminal
investigations and surveillance) requires information sharing across agencies
(i.e., lateral mechanisms).
In another example, the chief of a large, urban fire department described
the role of collaborative structures as a mechanism for enabling other fac-
tors that, in turn, further increased effectiveness of collaboration. In these
examples, formal structure initially enabled the collaborative development
of response plans. As part of these plans, joint training and exercises were
conducted, which in turn led to the development of personal relationships.
‘‘Each member then has a better understanding of each other’s needsy.
The common goal, safety of civilians, can be achieved through the exchange
of information and knowledge. Collaboration is attained through a personal
touch, a handshake and a smile.’’
Incentives to Collaborate. The participants had several examples of the
impact of an externally driven financial opportunity that required collab-
oration. One example follows:
The initial development of the group [resulted from having] to determine how to spend
around $7 million. While this amount will not provide ample funding for security for all
agencies, the coming together and development of a single vision of what homeland
security should be in the region was developed.
This quote indicates that the external incentive and requirement initiates the
collaboration. In successful situations, this initial interaction generates a
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shared purpose or common goal beyond the initial requirements of a grant
application. Another participant made explicit the extent to which these
incentives were causing a new way of thinking and new innovative be-
haviors:
For several years, there was so much dissent and resentfulness between the county and
the cityy. The grants seem to migrate to the city, leaving the county feeling like a
stepchild. For FY05, the rules changed. When it was stipulated that all grant proposals
had to be a ‘‘regional’’ effort, the tables turned. Suddenly, competing for the grant was
out of the question because winning the proposal would benefit all counties in the
regionyThis was a big change and we had more cooperation and collaboration than at
any other time. I believe it is simply because the element of competition was removed
from the process.
This quote, while generated to describe a success factor, also illustrates
a barrier to collaboration that was frequently identified in Study One:
‘‘competition for resources’’ and ‘‘territoriality.’’ This response and
others like it provide further evidence that the challenges of effective col-
laboration are qualitatively different in the phases of DHS planning and
prevention than in the situation of crisis response (Bellavita, 2005).
In a crisis situation, the issue of competition is less present; agency rival-
ries are more likely to become secondary to time critical response require-
ments. However, in planning and prevention, bureaucratic processes and
historical relationships embedded in competition over resources, decision
authority, power, and visibility prevail and create inhibitions to coopera-
tion. These can be overcome in the short term by mandating collabora-
tion or creating incentives that foster cooperation (e.g., regional grant
proposals).
The preliminary evidence from the stories shared by these professionals
suggests that both collaborative structures and external incentives can en-
able personal interactions. Thus they provide a forum, but they do not
assure successful collaboration. They offer technical vehicles that can – but
do not necessarily – generate increased familiarity across organizations, an
appreciation of the capabilities and requirements of other agencies, and
opportunities for participating individuals to build social capital. All of
these factors, in turn, improve collaborative capacity.
Social Capital as a Lateral Mechanism. As noted in the discussion of
social capital in Study One, this factor derives significantly from networks of
human interaction. The quote ending the section on ‘‘collaborative struc-
tures’’ gave a simple illustration of how social capital is developed: ‘‘Col-
laboration is attained through a personal touch, a handshake and a smile.’’
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Another study participant gave a more detailed explanation of the value of
this concept in developing collaborative capacity.
For a time-constrained professional, one way to screen work/opportunities/tasks is by
evaluating the messenger. This task force only got off the ground when members of the
task force, all of whom have known each other for a number of years, agreed to pursue
this joint venture. A shared respect by the involved parties provided the impetus to push
pre-existing priorities aside in order to make room for this new effort. These relation-
ships ensure that phone calls are answered, e-mails replied to in a timely manner, and,
generally speaking, that we stay on task. Without these relationships, this project would
have been just another thing to do ‘‘some day.’’
This quote also provides a significant contrast to the approach of top–down
or externally driven mandates or incentives for collaboration. In this vi-
gnette (and others identifying the key value of social capital), the initiative
came from inside the organization and was based on the lateral network of
social and professional relationships. We hypothesize that interagency in-
teractions that are based solely on external incentives will not develop a
sustainable collaborative orientation or necessary collaborative capacity
unless participating organizations are able to successfully develop the social
networks illustrated by the example above.
Another participant in Study Two provides an additional perspective on
the need for social capital:
I wonder, probably because our state is reorganizing and many key players in homeland
security are losing their positions, how do we keep up with our collaborative efforts
without losing momentum in times of change for political and other reasons? It seems
that if we do not have relationships with the individuals in middle management in
partnering organizations, we will always be starting over and never get past the first
stages of collaboration and, therefore, unable to build solid preparedness, prevention,
and response systems.
This quote identifies the problem of relying on social capital that may only
exist at the top of government agencies. Because these positions are political
appointments, and may turnover frequently, it is important to build stable
social networks at the mid-level and operating core of the organization. Also
implicit in this quote is an acknowledgment of the developmental nature of
collaboration. Building collaborative capacity is a multifaceted endeavor
requiring systemic attention, resources, commitment, and opportunities for
interaction.
People: Mutual Respect. Several participants mentioned positive and re-
spectful interpersonal interactions as important to the success of interagency
collaboration. For example, ‘‘treating all players with dignity and honor
enabled the project to have a unified front.’’ A medical professional working
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on bioterrorism preparedness identified mutual respect and acknowledg-
ment of expertise: ‘‘We respected everyone’s role; let each discipline do what
they do best.’’ It might be argued that the factors that were summarized
above as social capital under Lateral Mechanisms should be placed in the
category of People in the systems taxonomy. We acknowledge that social
capital is grounded in individual-level networks and rely on individual lat-
eral skills (Mankin, Cohen, & Fitzgerald, 2004). However, we judged that
the importance of this factor, in the context of interagency collaboration, is
better characterized by emphasizing the role of social capital as a lateral
mechanism than as an individual-level phenomenon.
DEVELOPING ORGANIZATION DESIGN DYNAMICS
TO IMPROVE COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY:
AN INNOVATIVE STRATEGY FOR DHS
The data from Study Two provide important insights about the interrela-
tionships among the factors that contribute to successful interorganizational
collaboration in the context of homeland security. Most of the quotes
above, while used to illustrate a single factor, also elaborate how one factor
either contributed to or derived from other factors. For example, a per-
ceived threat or high-risk situation (felt need) might lead to the establish-
ment of an interagency committee or task force (collaborative structure) to
address the concern. This might generate joint procedures (formalized
structure) or an interagency training event (lateral mechanism). Through the
interaction resulting from planning joint procedures or conducting joint
training, social capital can be developed.
Alternatively, the initiation of collaboration might come from an external
grant opportunity (incentive) that requires multiple agency participation.
The process of accomplishing this task likely depends on establishing a task
force or liaison roles (collaborative structures). At the organizational level,
working together to meet the proposal requirements requires identifying a
common goal or a willingness to address other agencies’ interests (purpose
and strategy). This planning process can increase familiarity and appreci-
ation for the interests and capabilities of participating organizations and
build social capital through strengthened professional networks (lateral
mechanisms); it can contribute to the development of trust and under-
standing at the level of individual representatives (people).
A quote from a research scientist in Study Two nicely illustrates one
example of how the organizational systems components interact in building
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collaborative capacity:
Four agencies were to investigate the vulnerabilities of a metropolitan water distribution
networky. Unless you have worked with these groups, it is difficult to appreciate how
much non-cooperation occurs. Quite a bit of turf protection goes on because of walls
built through time and lack of communication between managers. We discovered that by
defining each agency’s responsibilities, both communication and teamwork effort pro-
gressed well; cooperation between agencies was enhanced. Early in the process we re-
alized thaty one specific agency did not have the expertise necessary to address the
matter at hand; it would require the expertise of numerous personnel from the various
groupsy. By delineating responsibilities between agencies and groups, the effectiveness
of interagency communication and teamwork was enhanced. As a result of this process,
plans are underway to develop a training scenario that will involve local hazmat teams,
fire, police, and the EMS along with the four agencies. Finally, in my opinion, the
relationships fostered from this [vulnerability assessment] have gone a long way in
knocking down the barriers between agencies (at least locally), which should greatly
improve future cooperation and collaboration.
This example begins by stipulating the context of ‘‘non-cooperation.’’
Clearly, an innovation in interagency interaction was required to address a
problem that exceeded the capacity of any single organization. This ac-
knowledged interdependence created a shared purpose. Role clarity pro-
vided structure and improved communication (lateral mechanism). The
initial effort has led to plans for a joint training scenario (lateral mechanism)
that will bring together personnel from four different agencies. The more
immediate result of the work to date has been in the development of in-
terpersonal relationships. All of these elements, together, have contributed
to the improved collaborative capacity of the system of agencies facing a
common problem of homeland security.
We try to capture the dynamic interaction among all of these factors in
the image presented in Fig. 1. This diagram shows two organizations (A and
B) facing a homeland security problem in which they have some interde-
pendent interest or responsibility. Each organization can be represented in
terms of the five organization design components derived from Galbraith
(2002). The arrows indicate the dynamic interaction among the system ele-
ments both within and between organizations as they contribute to the
collaborative capability to meet the homeland security problem.
The dynamic interactions occur in at least three domains. First, effective
collaborative capacity requires that the five system elements (Strategy,
Structure, Incentives, Lateral Mechanisms, and People) for each participat-
ing organization be aligned with each other and with the environmental
requirement or challenge (cf. Nadler & Tushman, 1980). This is reflected
in the arrows within each of the three pentagons. However, because the
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homeland security problem assumes interdependence among multiple or-
ganizations, developing collaborative capacity cannot be accomplished by
focusing solely on the dynamics within each organization. There also needs
to be alignment of the system elements across organizations. Finally, as
illustrated by the data reported above, temporary or permanent interagency
structures are frequently established to better enable the collaborative re-
sponse to the DHS problem. In such a case, a third domain of interaction
needs to be developed so that the design characteristics of the interagency
task force or team are not only internally consistent, but also are aligned
with the primary organizations that it represents.
CONCLUSION
Collaboration is required in partnerships, teams, and organizations, but
our focus is on developing collaborative capacity between and among
Fig. 1. Developing Organization Design Dynamics to Improve Collaborative
Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for DHS.
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organizations. Collaboration for homeland security is occurring in the con-
text of under-designed institutional relationships. Leaders and interagency
collaborative teams must therefore work to create novel processes, systems,
protocols, and networks. They are faced with tasks of overcoming likely
institutional barriers resulting from unique and partially conflicting mis-
sions, goals and incentives, and they need to facilitate and enable organ-
izational collaboration through processes that we have categorized in an
interagency design framework. The alternative to design is organization ‘‘by
default,’’ which is likely to be inadequate, as recent cases reveal.
Organizational responses to hostile, complex, uncertain events – to crises
– are always likely to require intelligent improvisation. But planning and
preparation become critical in setting the stage for such successful reactions.
In the absence of adequate preparation, collaborative capacity is likely to be
low, plans are unlikely to be translated into action, and actions are likely to
be delayed, inefficient, and ineffective.
Proactive preparation and design can be conceptualized in terms of an
interorganizational systems perspective. As in the literature on organizational
change and intercultural learning, ‘‘felt need’’ is likely to be a prerequisite for
building collaborative relationships. Common goals and recognition of
interdependence – we succeed or fail together – provide a sense of purpose
for individual actors to move toward the new paradigm of working as a
larger team. Divergent goals, goal ambiguity, parochialism, and organiza-
tional rigidity are barriers that will block the larger purpose of collaboration.
Some individuals may not appreciate the importance of the larger struc-
tural context. However, formalizing relationships (e.g., coordination com-
mittees and liaison roles) and attending to issues of legitimacy and authority
(e.g., making sure those on an interagency task force are representative of
the organization and are capable of making decisions) are potential success
factors. Conversely, inadequate authority, conflicting rules, and inadequate
role clarity create a context for frustration and failure.
Lateral mechanisms need to be developed that correspond to the requisite
interdependence of the intergovernmental agencies. Where agencies depend
on each other for resources or have sequential and reciprocal task inter-
dependence, leaders must spend time and energy to develop and institu-
tionalize lateral mechanisms. Of special importance in this context are social
capital and opportunities and incentives for information exchange and so-
cial relationships. In the absence of familiarity and a history of information
sharing, collaborative capacity is likely to be low.
Rewards must be aligned to support collaboration. As Kerr (1975)
reminds us, it is foolish to expect collaboration when incentives for
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collaboration are negative or non-existence. If collaboration is a prerequisite
for funding and resources, and if leadership rewards the time and energy
spent developing interorganizational relationships and clarifying roles and
processes, then the collaborative capacity might be developed. If leadership
rewards accomplishing localized, competitive objectives and goals, rede-
signing structures will not be sufficient to generate collaborative capacity.
Finally, people who lack the ability and motivation (i.e., a lack of col-
laborative competency or arrogance and animosity for the other agencies)
drain teams of the potential for collaborative capacity. Collaboration is
interpersonally and managerially challenging and requires commitment
and motivation, competence, trust, and an appreciation of how others do
business.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Collaborative capacity is an intuitively appealing construct but currently
lacks clear operationalization. This deficiency is problematic for homeland
security leaders and practitioners who want to identify the collaborative
capacity of their agencies. The absence of measurement models also is
problematic for the advancement of the social science of interagency col-
laboration. The factors in Studies One and Two above were inductively
generated in the hope of identifying dimensions that need to be measured to
operationalize the construct. Thus, the next challenge researchers must face
is how to diagnose or audit the collaborative capacity of organizations that
are expected to be in effective collaborative relationships.
NOTES
1. The Department of Homeland Security’s mission includes the prevention and
detection of terrorist threats as well as coordinating national responses to natural
disasters, or other emergencies.
2. The Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) is located at the Naval
Postgraduate School (www.nps.edu) in Monterey, CA. Since 2002, CHDS has con-
ducted a wide range of programs focused on assisting current and future homeland
security leaders to develop the policies, strategies, programs, and organizational
elements needed to defeat terrorism in the United States. The programs are deve-
loped in partnership with and are sponsored by the DHS’s office for Domestic
Preparedness.
3. Stu Winby, founder and managing partner of The Sapience Group, assisted in
the design and delivery of the workshop.
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